Game Theory has been frequently applied in biological research since 1970s. While the key idea of Game Theory is Nash Equilibrium, it is critical to understand and figure out the payoff matrix in order to calculate Nash Equilibrium. In this paper we present a dynamic programming implemented method to compute 2 × 2 non-cooperative finite resource allocation game's payoff matrix. We assume in one population there exists two types of individuals, aggressive and non-aggressive and each individual has equal and finite resource. The strength of individual could be described by a function of resource consumption in different development stages. Each individual undergoes logistic growth hence we divide the development into three stages: initialization, quasilinear growth and termination. We first discuss the theoretical frame of how to dynamic programming to calculate payoff matrix then give three numerical examples representing three different types of aggressive individuals and calculate the payoff matrix for each of them respectively. Based on the numerical payoff matrix we further investigate the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of the games.
Inspired by their ideas, we will use food source to compute the payoff of aggressive and non-aggressive players in a 2 × 2 game.
While we assume the food source is finite and equivalent to any member in the population, it is natural to use dynamic programming (DP) to figure out the optimal foraging strategy as a resource allocation problem. Animal growth rate is a logistic curve and we divide the whole growth process into three distinct stages: initialization, quasilinear growth and termination. In different stages, the payoff is a linear function of food source with different slope and our goal is to determine the maximum total payoff at the end of growth using dynamic programming.
Al-Tamimi has suggested using dynamic programming to implement Game Theory model for designing (Al-Tamimi A, Abu-Khalaf M and Lewis FL. 2007) but their model is zero-sum. We will first present a more realistic general sum game framework, then discuss three different types of aggressive players, calculate the numerical payoff matrix for each case and determine the ESS for them. Our work is the first of this kind to combine dynamic programming and Game Theory, two different optimization tools together to solve real biological problem.
Defining the Model
A typical 2 × 2 non-cooperative general sum game has the following form where P ji defines the payoff of player i in j th strategy combination.
Strategy
Non-aggressive Aggressive
Non-aggressive (P 111 , P 112 ) (P 121 , P 122 ) Aggressive (P 211 , P 212 ) (P 221 , P 222 ) Table 1 . Payoff Matrix of non-cooperative general sum game P ijk denotes the payoff of player k when it uses strategy i and its components uses j. Here we have two types of strategies: aggressive (2) and non-aggressive (1). Aggressive players would fight their neighbor and try to get their resources. Non-aggressive players only concentrate on their own food source and never fight back even when they are attacked. However, if two aggressive players meet, it would result in a severe fight and both players are terribly hurt. This definition is similar to that of "Chicken-Dare" or "Hawk-Dove" game. The Nash Equilibrium is defined as: Definition 1. x ∈ Θ is a Nash Equilibrium if x ∈β(x), where Θ is the mixed strategy space andβ is the mixed strategy best response correspondence.
Because this is a 2 × 2 finite symmetric game, ∆ N E = ∅ by Kakutani's Theorem. Next we switch to a population perspective and define Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) as follows:
Definition 2. x ∈ ∆ is an ESS if for every strategy y = x there exists someǭ y ∈ (0, 1) such that
holds for all ǫ ∈ (0,ǭ y ) where ǫ is the proportion of mutant strategy.
Basically, ESS is a subset of Nash Equilibrium. We use Maynard's criterion to test whether a Nash
Equilibrium is an ESS:
To perform all these analysis, we must first define the payoff matrix of our original game. We will use DP to determine the numerical payoff values for the four strategy combinations. Assume each player has a total of N food sources for the entire development period and in each stage at least 1 resource should be consumed in order to maintain basal metabolism. As we have discussed before, the development period is divided into three stages: growth initialization, quasilinear growth and growth termination, 
Because logistic curve has a sigmoid shape and is usually symmetric, it is reasonable to set a = c to reduce computational intensity. The coefficients a and b has biological meaning of the efficiency of converting food sources into its own energy and in our model b > a. The DP model is written as follows:
The backward DP Formulation for this model is:
OVF: f k (x) = optimal return for the allocation of x units of resource to stage k · · · 3.
ARG: (k, x) = (stage, units of resource consumed).
OPF: P k (x) = units of resource consumed at stage k.
For the non-aggressive and non-aggressive strategy combination, we assume both players do not interfere each other. In this case, we would only solve the DP for one of them and by symmetry, the other player should adopt same strategy to maximize its total payoff. The cost in each stage and state is shown in Table 2 and we could calculate the optimal value using DP.
For the non-aggressive and aggressive strategy combination, the cost table is similar to In this simplest case, we assume both aggressive player and non-aggressive player only fight after they have depleted all their resources. In real ecosystem, some animals don't fight while they are young.
In fact, they may even help each other (Taborsky M. 2001)! They fight only when they are sexually matured. So here we don't even have to bother DP. We assume the optimal payoffs of non-aggressive and non-aggressive combination is (1, 1) and aggressive player could take advantage of half of the nonaggressive player's payoff but lose 80% of its own payoff when it encounters another aggressive player. 
Type III Model: Battles in Every Stage
In this model the aggressive player will fight in all stages to maximize its payoff. While it is difficult to model the interaction of fighting for food source, instead we give the aggressive player larger coefficients than in Model I and non-aggressive player smaller coefficients when they encounter. For the aggressiveaggressive strategy combination, we simply give both players 0 because of fighting severity. Since they fight in each stage, there is no final battle in this circumstance. In this model we also consider two Player Non-aggressive Aggressive Non-aggressive Aggressive Aggressive (14,9.5) (0,0) Table 9 . Payoff Matrix of One Condition of Type III Model
The non-aggressive and non-aggressive strategy combination is the only Nash Equilibrium in this game; there is no mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. This is also the ESS by Maynard's criterion. In this game there are three Nash Equilibria, almost the same as in type I game except that mixed Nash Equilibrium requires 7 9 non-aggressive and 2 9 aggressive strategy. From a population point of view, by applying Maynard's criterion, the mixed Nash Equilibrium is the only ESS in the evolutionary game.
Discussion
Though we use DP to find out the optimal allocation strategy, we have already found under certain circumstances, for instance if b > a, most of our resources should be allocated to the second stage, the quasilinear growth. In Type II Model we have also realized the growth does not necessarily be a linear function. Here we present a criterion to test if we could use the growth function directly to allocate resources optimally:
Assume symmetric growth still holds and define y = f (x) for both growth initialization and growth termination and y = g(x) for quasilinear growth. Notice the term "quasilinear growth" here does not mean the growth function is linear, it could be nonlinear anyway. If the following is true then we should allocate most of our resource in the quasilinear growth stage and minimum for growth initialization and
is not concave and g
However, this criterion is only sufficient but not necessary. It is possible to investigate the sufficient and necessary condition but the computational intensity is almost the same of using DP because we must compute the first order partial derivative (gradient) of f (x) + f (y) + g(10 − x − y) with respect to x and y, the resource allocated in stage 1 and 3, and determine the structure of the gradient.
In this research project we focus on finite and equal resource allocation problem for both players.
However, our approach could be extended to unequal resources because we use DP to determine the optimal strategy for each player so it does not matter whether the resources are equal for both players.
In other words, the player should not worry about the total amount of their resource (and actually they cannot determine the amount of resource because it is pre-specified.) but rather concentrate on how to optimize the return from the resource (the optimal strategy). It is also possible to assume infinite resource, however the consumption of the player is bounded so infinite resource allocation problem could be transformed to finite resource allocation problem. As we have discussed before, saturation is a reasonable assumption to deal with infinite resource. Therefore, we could use DP to solve almost all types of resources allocation problem for 2 player game.
Another possible improvement of our approach is to introduce stochastic component into the model.
Instead of assigning a specific amount of resources, we could assume the food resource is from a certain probability distribution, say, normal distribution. In effect this is the extension of unequal resource allocation problem for 2 players. Besides, it is reasonable to assign a minimum threshold of development and if the player fail to reach that threshold it then dies. The remaining resources are transferred to its neighbor (its competitor). In this circumstance DP could still be applied but we expect the formulation is much more complicated. When we reach the optimal strategy of resource allocation we could still apply Game Theory to determine Nash Equilibrium for a given game but it is difficult to give a close form representation of what ESS looks like in this scenario because of stochasticity. We could use simulation to determine the evolutionary path and this approach is more realistic and useful.
